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Abstract 
I examine a manipulation scheme that public authorities can use to exercise more discretion in public 
procurement. I propose that regression discontinuity manipulation tests can be implemented to identify 
manipulative authorities. I investigate the European Union public procurement data set. I find that 10-
13% of examined authorities have high probabilities of bunching estimated costs just below thresholds. 
Manipulative authorities have significantly lower probabilities of employing competitive procurement 
procedure. The bunching manipulation scheme significantly diminishes cost-effectiveness of public 
procurement. On average, prices of below threshold contracts are 18-28% higher when the authority has 
an elevated probability of bunching.  
Keywords 
Public Procurement; Manipulation; Competition; European Union 
JEL Classification: C31, D44, H57 
 
1 Introduction
EU countries annually spend 14% of their GDPs on public procurement
(PP). Over 250,000 European Union (EU) public authorities acquire services,
works and supplies worth 1.9 trillion Euros using different procurement proce-
dures. Estimated costs and thresholds play an integral role in EU PP. European
Commission describes that:1 “EU law sets minimum harmonised rules for ten-
ders whose monetary value exceeds a certain amount and which are presumed
to be of cross-border interest. The European rules ensure that the award of
contracts of higher value for the provision of public goods and services must be
fair, equitable, transparent and non-discriminatory. For tenders of lower value
however, national rules apply ...” Accordingly, public officials can have sig-
nificantly higher levels of discretion over procurement process and awarding of
the contract when estimated costs are below EU thresholds. Public officials can
decide to use non competitive procedures like, direct purchase or negotiation.
These procedures have significantly lower transparency requirements and may
enable authorities to select firms. Authorities might be tempted to artificially
provide lower estimated costs below EU thresholds to be able to implement
non-competitive procurement methods. This manipulative practice is called
“bunching below thresholds”.
As stated by Palguta and Pertold (2017), public officials have more op-
portunities to manipulate procurement outcomes for below-threshold tenders.
Therefore, authorities might manipulate estimated costs to be below thresholds
to exercise more discretion. EU PP law recognizes this potential distortion. Ar-
ticle 5-3 of the 2014/24/EU addresses “bunching” estimated costs below thresh-
olds. It states that “... choice of the method used to calculate the estimated
1Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules-
implementation_en
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value of a procurement shall not be made with the intention of excluding it
from the scope of this Directive. A procurement shall not be subdivided with
the effect of preventing it from falling within the scope of this Directive, unless
justified by objective reasons.” In this paper, I employ a regression discontinuity
approach to determine the likelihood of bunching in EU PP. Specifically, I use
a regression discontinuity manipulation test to identify authorities that have
higher probabilities of bunching estimated values below EU thresholds. Then,
I examine the impact of this manipulative scheme on PP outcomes.
I find that 10-13% of the authorities have very high probabilities of ma-
nipulating estimated costs. The empirical analysis finds that authorities that
employ the bunching scheme are less likely to employ competitive procurement
procedures like open procedure (first price auctions). Procurement prices are
significantly higher in tenders conducted by bunching authorities. The bunching
scheme significantly diminishes cost-effectiveness of public procurement. On av-
erage, prices of below threshold contracts are 18-28% higher when the authority
has an elevated probability of bunching. Procurement prices of 844 construction
contracts that are conducted by authorities with high bunching probabilities are
342,308 Euros higher compared to construction contracts below the threshold
by other authorities. Similarly, average prices of 11,049 tenders by bunching au-
thorities in other sectors is 11,174 Euros higher than contracts by non-bunching
authorities. Directive 2014/24/EU states that the thresholds are 5,548,000 Eu-
ros for construction and 144,000 Euros for other contracts.2
Palguta and Pertold (2017) study manipulation of procurement values in
the Czech Republic. A change in the Czech procurement law in 2006 allowed
officials to determine procedures below a certain threshold. They find that ex-
2In addition, thresholds for all services concerning social and other specific ser-
vices listed in Annex XIV and all subsidized services are 750,000 and 221,000 Eu-
ros. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules-
implementation/thresholds_en.
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cess number of contracts below the threshold increased dramatically after 2006.
Coviello, et al. (2018) find that increased PP discretion in Italian municipali-
ties is associated with larger chances of repeated wins by the same firm. They
argue that discretion may improve PP outcomes. In contrast, Baltrunaite et al.
(2018) find that discretion leads to an advantage of politically connected and
less efficient firms. I contribute to the literature by quantifying the expected
costs of the bunching manipulation scheme on PP outcomes. I show that regres-
sion discontinuity manipulation tests can be implemented effectively to identify
potential manipulative authorities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes
the EU PP data. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy to detect bunching
manipulative behavior. Section 4 presents the extent of manipulation in the EU
PP. Section 5 displays the empirical analysis of the impact of manipulation on
EU PP and section 6 concludes.
2 Data
Data about EU PP data set is available as part of Tenders Electronic Daily
(TED) data set. The TED data is available online in CSV format for years
2006-2017.3 The EU extracts the data from the contract notice and contract
award notice standard forms filled in by the authorities.4 The original data
set contains information on 5,303,219 PP contracts for the European Economic
Area, Switzerland, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. For each
contract, the TED data includes variables about estimated cost, contract price,
detailed CPV code of the subject of procurement, procurement method, types of
3I use the contact award notices csv files. The files are available at
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/data/dataset/ted-csv.
4The standard forms of the EU are available at
"http://simap.ted.europa.eu/web/simap/standard-forms-for-public-procurement.
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contracting authorities and detailed names and locations of procuring agencies
and winning firms. The manipulation test employs the estimated cost variable.
I examine the distribution of the official estimated cost for each contract to
calculate the probability that an authority is manipulating estimated costs to
be below the EU threshold values. Article 5-1 of the 2014/24/EU describes
estimated cost as: “The calculation of the estimated value of a procurement
shall be based on the total amount payable, net of VAT, as estimated by the
contracting authority, including any form of option and any renewals of the
contracts as explicitly set out in the procurement documents.”
The estimated cost is available for 2,056,104 contracts. I employ the name
and city of each authority to identify individual contracting entities. I identify
92,297 authorities from 31 countries. Figure 1 below displays the distribution
of total number of contracts by each authority. 91% of the authorities conduct
fewer than 30 tenders.
4
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Figure 1: Histogram of Total Number of Contracts by Each Authority
Contracts larger than 50 are not displayed.
As stated by, Catteo, Jansson and Ma (2018) (CJM), a vital component
of manipulation testing is the bandwidth around the threshold. The choice of
bandwidth determines which observations near the cutoff are employed for cal-
culation of the test statistic. I implement the CJM methodology and determine
optimal bandwidths for each authority using the mean squared error (MSE) cri-
terion function. Catteo, Idrobo and Titiunik (2018b) state that “... bandwidths
much larger than the MSE-optimal bandwidth will lead to estimated RD effects
that have too much bias, and bandwidths much smaller than the MSE-optimal
choice will lead to RD effects with too much variance.” (page 106) The ma-
nipulation test requires appropriate number of observations in the bandwidths.
Accordingly, I employ two alternative criteria to select the authorities for ma-
nipulation analysis. I analyze authorities with more than 20 observations or
30 observations in the bandwidth.5 There are 2,044 and 1,416 authorities with
510 (15) contracts below and above the threshold.
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more than 20 and 30 observations in the bandwidth respectively. After elimi-
nation of authorities with insufficient number of contracts , I examine 260,167
and 219,391 contracts conducted by 2,044 and 1,416 authorities.
Authorities implement the competitive “OPEN” procedure for 86% of con-
tracts. Remaining contracts are awarded using “award without prior publication
of a contract notice” and negotiation procedures. Additionally, TED data set
provides information about type of contracting authority like ministry or federal
authority and regional or local authority. I employ 10 authority type dummy
variables to control for authority specific characteristics as Kutlina-Dimitrova
and Lakatos (2016).
3 Empirical Strategy
I employ the manipulation test based on density discontinuity of CJM. CJM
describes the test as “ ... test for a discontinuity in the density of a random
sample of units that has been divided in two disjoint groups, according to a hard-
thresholding rule based on an observed random variable ... and a known cutoff
point.” (page 3) I employ the thresholds stated at the 2014/24/EU directive on
public procurement as cutoff points. I implement the CJM test separately to
each public authority. The test determines whether authorities are systemati-
cally bunching estimated costs below EU thresholds (sorting around the cutoff
points). In the absence of bunching, the density of observations (estimated
costs) should be continuous. CJM proposes a local-polynomial density estima-
tor to estimate the probability density function of estimated cost (c), f(c). The
manipulation test is a hypothesis test on the continuity of the density f(c) at
the EU threshold, T . The test can be formulated as following:
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Ho : lim
c↑T
f(c) = lim
c↓T
f(c) (1)
CJM provide an excellent description of the test in pages 5-13. I refrain from
repetition and refer to CJM for details of the test.
I normalize the estimated costs with respect to the threshold.
NESp =
estimatedcostp − thresholdp
thresholdp
The normalized estimated cost of procurement p, NESp, is zero at the
threshold. Figure 2 below displays the histograms of normalized estimated costs
for non-bunching and bunching authorities identified by the CJM manipulation
test. Part 2 of figure 2 shows that there is a spike just below the threshold
for normalized estimated costs of bunching authorities. In comparison, the
normalized estimated costs of non-bunching authorities are declining similar to
the distribution of estimated costs in Czech Republic presented in Palguta and
Pertold (2017).
Figure 2: Normalized Estimated costs of Non-Bunching and Bunching Authorities
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We calculate the manipulation test statistic with respect to normalized threshold
value of zero. Figure 3 below displays the distribution of NESp with respect to
the thresholds for two sample authorities: non-bunching and bunching.
Sample Non-Bunching Authority Sample Bunching Authority
Figure 3: Regression Discontinuity Plots of sample Non-Bunching and Bunching Authorities
Figure 3 shows the intuition of the CJM manipulation test. The estimated
cost is continuous in the first part of the graph for a non-bunching authority
without a kink. In comparison, there is a major kink at the normalized threshold
of zero for the bunching authority. There are significantly more contracts just
below the threshold. Therefore, the test for the continuity of estimated costs
conclude that probability of manipulation is significantly high for the authority
in the second part of figure 3.
4 European Union Authorities and Bunching
After determining the suitable bandwidths, I calculate the discontinuity test
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statistics for authorities with more than 20 and more than 30 observations in the
bandwidth. 2,044 authorities have more than 20 and 1,416 have more than 30
observations in the bandwidth. Accordingly, I can safely calculate manipulation
test statistics for these authorities. Figure 4 displays manipulation test p-values
for these authorities.
2,044 authorities with more than 1,416 authorities with more than
20 observations. 30 observations.
Figure 4: Histograms of Manipulation Test P-Values
Figure 4 displays that a number of authorities have p-values between 0 and
0.05. The null hypothesis of the test is that the values are continuous around
the threshold. In other words, the values are not manipulated to be artificially
below the threshold. For authorities with more than 20 observations, p-values
are below 0.05 for 210 (10%) authorities and below 0.01 for 89 authorities.
The test concludes that 210 authorities manipulate estimated costs to be below
the threshold values. For authorities with more than 30 observations, p-values
are below 0.05 for 178 (13%) authorities and below 0.01 for 79 authorities.
Accordingly, manipulation tests suggest that 10-13% of the examined authori-
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ties6 potentially manipulate estimated costs to implement the “bunching below
thresholds” scheme.
5 Impact of Bunching on Public Procurement
In this section, I examine the impact of the bunching manipulation scheme on
PP. I study whether bunching authorities are more likely to implement non-
competitive procurement procedures. Furthermore, I investigate the impact of
bunching on PP cost-effectiveness.
5.1 Bunching and Choice of Competitive Procurement Pro-
cedure
Article 18-1 of the 2014/24/EU directive expresses the importance of com-
petition as: “Contracting authorities shall treat economic operators equally and
without discrimination and shall act in a transparent and proportionate man-
ner. The design of the procurement shall not be made with the intention of
excluding it from the scope of this Directive or of artificially narrowing com-
petition. Competition shall be considered to be artificially narrowed where the
design of the procurement is made with the intention of unduly favouring or
disadvantaging certain economic operators.” Bunching authorities may refrain
from competitive procedures to be able to manipulate the PP process. To test
this hypothesis, I estimate the logistic regression equation presented below to
assess the effect of bunching on the probability of employing the competitive
“OPEN” procedure which is a first price auction mechanism.
62,044 authorities with more than 20 observations and 1,416 authorities with more than
30 observations in optimal bandwidths.
10
Bedri Kamil Onur Tas
Pr(openp = 1) = β0 +M
n,α
p β1 + Controlθ + εp (2)
Pr(openp = 1) is the probability that the binary variable of open procedure
is equal to 1 indicating that open procedure is implemented in procurement p.
Mn,αp is one if the manipulation test concludes that the official in procurement
p is implementing the bunching manipulation scheme. n denotes whether the
official has more than 20 or more than 30 observations. α is p-value of the
manipulation test, 0.05 or 0.01. For example, M20,0.05p is one when the entity
has more than 20 observations in the bandwidth around the threshold and the
p-value of the manipulation test is smaller than 0.05. I employ four alternative
variables for manipulation to obtain robust results: M20,0.05p , M20,0.01p , M30,0.05p
and M30,0.01p . Finally, Control vector contains dummy variables for 9 author-
ity types, 71 different sectors, 30 countries and 11 years. The coefficient of
interest, β1, gauges whether bunching authorities are less like to implement the
competitive open procedure.
Similar to the existing studies like Palguta and Pertold (2017), equation 2
ignores the possibility that the manipulated variable, Mn,αp , might be endoge-
nous. There might be unobserved characteristics that determine which officials
will implement the bunching manipulation scheme. Mn,αp might be endogenous
because error term represents these unobserved characteristics. To take into
account potential endogeneity of Mn,αp , I implement an instrumental variable
(IV) GMM estimation of a linear probability model with robust standard er-
rors. The TED data set contains a variable which denotes whether a contract
is covered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA). The EU ‘SIMAP’ form for public procurement contains ques-
tion IV.1.8 that asks whether the procurement is covered by the WTO GPA.7
7Acronym for information system for public procurement (fr. systeme d’information pour
les marches publics).
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62,389 (42.5%) tenders of 146,704 contracts below threshold are covered by the
WTO GPA.
TheWTOGPA provides the Signatory Parties with a framework for ensuring
that tenders covered by it are conducted in a competitive, non-discriminatory,
and transparent manner, satisfying the conditions with regard to integrity. Arti-
cle II of WTO GPA describes the scope and coverage of the agreement in detail.8
Contracts covered by the WTO GPA are subject to additional scrutiny by in-
ternational organizations and authorities. Accordingly, contracts covered by the
WTO GPA are less likely to be manipulated by EU authorities. Table OA.1 in
the Online Appendix confirms this argument. The first-stage regressions show
that GPA Covered has a significant negative coefficient for all manipulation
variables. WTO GPA covered contracts have significantly lower manipulation
scores. The significant relationship between the endogenous variable,Mn,αp , and
exogenous structure of GPA covered variable makes it an ideal candidate for a
valid IV. Accordingly, I construct a variable that is 1 when when a contract is
covered by the WTO GPA and 0 otherwise, GPA covered. I employ the GPA
covered variable as the IV and estimate the linear probability model below.
openp = β0 +M
n,α
p γ1 + Controlθ + εp (3)
openp is the dummy variable that is one when an authority implements the
open procedure. I estimate coefficients of equations 2 and 3 for below threshold
contracts using Logit and IV GMM. Table 1 displays the estimation results.
The coefficients of four alternative manipulated variables, Mn,αp , are significant
with negative coefficients. Accordingly, table 1 concludes that bunching author-
ities have significantly lower probabilities of implementing the competitive open
procedure.
8The coverage schedules are available online at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_app_agree_e.htm.
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(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.)
I implement the methodology of Conley et al. (2012) to assess the robust-
ness of the IV GMM results. Conley et al. (2012) develop methods to obtain
inferences when IVs are “plausibly exogenous.” They define plausible exogeneity
as the correlation between the IVs and endogenous variables being close to 0
but not exactly 0. This methodology can employ “instruments that are strong
but may violate the exclusion restriction” (Conley et al. 2012, 261). Therefore,
I conduct an additional robustness analysis by calculating confidence intervals
of coefficients under the assumption that the IV, GPA Covered, is “plausibly ex-
ogenous.” Table 2 shows the 95% lower and upper bounds of the coefficients,γ1,
of equation 3. Table 2 presents that coefficients of all manipulated variables are
statistically significant and negative. Accordingly, the methodology of Conley
et al. (2012) confirms the robustness and validity of IV GMM results of Table
1.
(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.)
The final robustness analysis implements the regression specification of Palguta
and Pertold (2017) for the complete data set, 258,943 contracts including ten-
ders with estimated costs above the thresholds. Palguta and Pertold (2017)
employ the interaction variable of manipulation and estimated cost being below
the threshold to assess the effect of manipulation on PP. Accordingly, I con-
duct further robustness analysis by estimating the coefficients of the following
alternative regression specifications using logistic regression estimation and IV
GMM with robust standard errors.
Pr(openp = 1) = γ0 +M
n,α
p +BelowTpγ2 + Controlθ + εp (4)
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Pr(openp = 1) = γ0 +M
n,α
p ∗BelowTpγ1 +BelowTpγ2 + Controlθ + εp (5)
openp = γ0 +M
n,α
p +BelowTpγ2 + Controlθ + εp (6)
openp = γ0 +M
n,α
p ∗BelowTpγ1 +BelowTpγ2 + Controlθ + εp (7)
In equations 4-7, γ1 measures the effect of bunching officials on probabil-
ity of open procedure in contracts with estimated costs below EU thresholds.
BelowTp is one if estimated cost of procurement p is below EU thresholds.
Online Appendix table OA.2 presents Logit estimation of equations 4 and 5.
Table OA.3 presents IV GMM linear probability model estimation of equation
6 and 7.9 All alternative regression specifications confirm the negative effect
of bunching manipulation scheme on the probability that an authority employs
competitive open procedure.
5.2 Bunching and Cost-Effectiveness
This section investigates whether bunching below thresholds by authorities
impact procurement prices and cost-effectiveness. I follow the regression speci-
fication of Bajari et al. (2014) and estimate the effect of manipulative behavior
on the ratio of procurement price and estimated cost. Bajari et al. (2014) show
that using the ratio as the dependent variable improves the efficiency of re-
gression estimates by controlling for heteroskedasticity. Specifically, I estimate
9Table OA.4 in the online appendix present the Conley et al. (2012) lower and upper
bounds of plausibly exogenous IV for IV GMM estimation of equations 6 and 7. Table OA.7
displays the first-stage regression results of IV GMM estimation of equations 6 and 7.
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the following regression equation for below threshold contracts using IV GMM
described above.10
contractpricep
estimatedcostp
= β0 +M
n,α
p β1 +Openpβ2 + Controlθ + εp (8)
An alternative estimation strategy employs the description of OECD (2012)
to identify cost-ineffective contracts. OECD (2012) states that “value for money”
can be assessed by comparing the procurement price and estimated costs. Specif-
ically, procurement prices that are higher than estimated cost are cost-ineffective.
OECD (2012) suggests that public authorities should investigate these tenders.
I employ the Cost − Ineffectivep dummy variable as the dependent variable.
Specifically, Cost−Ineffectivep variable is one when the contract price is higher
than the estimated cost. Then, I estimate the following linear probability model
for below threshold contracts using IV GMM.
Cost− Ineffectivep = β0 +Mn,αp γ1 +Openpγ2 + Controlθ + εp (9)
Openp is one when an official uses the open procedure. As in section 5.1, I
employ the GPA Covered variable as IV. Table 3 displays the IV GMM estima-
tion of equations 8 and 9. All manipulated variables in Table 3 have significant
positive coefficients. Therefore, contract price compared to the estimated cost is
significantly higher when a manipulative authority conducts the procurement.
The likelihood that the contract is cost-ineffective increases significantly when
the authority has a high probability of implementing the bunching manipulation
10I implement Billor et al.’s (2000) BACONmethodology (blocked adaptive computationally
efficient outlier nominators) to identify the outliers. The BACON method identifies contracts
with ratios lower than 0.25 and higher than 1.87 as outliers. I remove 6,933 contracts with
unrealistic values.
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scheme.
(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.)
I perform robustness analysis by calculating confidence intervals of coeffi-
cients under the assumption that the IV, GPA Covered, is plausibly exogenous.
Table 4 presents the 95% lower and upper bounds of the coefficients β1 and γ1
of equations 8 and 9. Confidence intervals with plausibly exogenous IV confirms
the robustness and validity of IV GMM results of Table 3.
(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE.)
Finally, I employ the regression specification of Palguta and Pertold (2017)
for the complete data set, 184,218 contracts including tenders with estimated
costs above the thresholds.
contractpricep
estimatedcostp
= β0+M
n,α
p β1+Openpβ2+BelowTpβ3+Controlθ+ εp (10)
contractpricep
estimatedcostp
= γ0+M
n,α
p ∗BelowTpγ1+Openpβ2+BelowTpβ3+Controlθ+εp
(11)
Table OA.5 in the Online Appendix show the IV GMM estimation of equa-
tions 10 and 11. Table OA.6 presents that lower and upper bounds for plau-
sibly exogenous instruments. Alternative regression specification results of Ta-
bles OA.5 and OA.6 validate the findings of tables 3 and 4. Bunching below
thresholds manipulation scheme substantially rises procurement costs and di-
minishes cost-effectiveness of PP contracts. Back of the envelope calculations
show that prices of below threshold construction tenders conducted by bunch-
ing authorities are on average 342,308-602,791 Euros (for M10,0.05p and M15,0.01p )
16
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higher. Similarly, average costs of contracts in other sectors are on average
11,174-15,756 Euros (for M10,0.05p and M15,0.01p ) higher.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I detect the manipulative scheme of bunching below thresholds
in EU public procurement. I employ regression discontinuity manipulation tests
to identify authorities that manipulate estimated costs of contracts to be just
below EU thresholds. 10-13% of examined authorities have high probabilities
of implementing the manipulative scheme. I find that manipulative officials are
less likely to use the competitive open procurement procedure. I quantify the
impact of manipulation on EU PP cost-effectiveness. Contract prices compared
to estimated costs are significantly higher in tenders conducted by bunching
authorities. The bunching scheme significantly diminishes cost-effectiveness of
public procurement. Procurement prices of 844 construction contracts that are
conducted by authorities with high bunching probabilities are 342,308 Euros
higher compared to construction contracts below the threshold by other au-
thorities. Similarly, average prices of 11,049 tenders by bunching authorities in
other sectors is 11,174 Euros higher than contracts by non-bunching authorities.
The findings of the paper suggest that public officials can implement regression
discontinuity manipulation tests to detect manipulative authorities.
17
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Table 1 
Effect of Manipulation on Probability of Competitive Procedure (Open) 
 
 Logit  IV GMM Linear Probability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Manipulated  -0.49         
(n=20, p=0.05) (16.37)**         
Manipulated   -0.47        
(n=20, p=0.01)  (11.99)**        
Manipulated    -0.52       
(n=30, p=0.05)   (16.53)**       
Manipulated     -0.48      
(n=30, p=0.01)    (12.08)**      
Manipulated Interaction      -0.65    
(n=20, p=0.05)      (11.17)**    
Manipulated Interaction       -1.13   
(n=20, p=0.01)       (10.28)**   
Manipulated Interaction        -1.09  
(n=30, p=0.05)        (15.76)**  
Manipulated Interaction         -1.46 
(n=30, p=0.01)         (14.46)** 
Constant 16.45 15.97 16.18 17.33  0.97 0.99 0.35 -2.30 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)  (20.82)** (22.53)** (4.05) (19.14)** 
Observations 165,359 165,359 137,946 137,946  146,704 146,704 123,695 218,334 
Authority Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. Robust z statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 2 
Robustness Analysis of Instrumental Variables in IV GMM Linear Probability Model 
Plausibly Exogenous Instrument 
 
Variable 95% Lower Bound 95% Upper Bound 
Manipulated (n=20, p=0.05) -1.33 -0.37 
Manipulated (n=20, p=0.01) -2.21 -0.59 
Manipulated (n=30, p=0.05) -1.31 -0.63 
Manipulated (n=30, p=0.01) -2.19 -1.02 
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Table 3 
Effect of Manipulation on Procurement Cost-Effectiveness  
IV GMM with GPA-Covered as Instrumental Variable 
 
 Ratio  Cost-Ineffective 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Manipulated 0.18     0.42    
(n=20, p=0.05) (4.70)**     (6.97)**    
Manipulated  0.30     0.69   
(n=20, p=0.01)  (4.65)**     (6.84)**   
Manipulated   0.24     0.40  
(n=30, p=0.05)   (6.12)**     (6.10)**  
Manipulated     0.28     0.57 
(n=30, p=0.01)    (5.09)**     (6.04)** 
Open Procedure -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05  -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (24.07)** (22.84)** (15.81)** (18.15)**  (1.67) (0.97) (2.62)** (2.13) 
Constant 0.91 0.91 -0.41 1.02  0.06 0.14 0.11 -0.02 
 (30.06)** (30.08)** (7.35)** (23.43)**  (12.63)** (2.15)** (46.31)** (0.84) 
Observations 125,517 125,517 108,053 108,053  125,517 125,517 108,053 108,053 
Authority Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. Dependent variable is the ratio of procurement price and estimated cost. IV GMM estimation with GPA Covered IV 
variable.  Robust z statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 4 
Robustness Analysis of Instrumental Variables in IV GMM  
Plausibly Exogenous Instruments 
 
Variable 95% Lower Bound 95% Upper Bound 
 Dependent Variable: Ratio  
Manipulated (n=20, p=0.05)  0.13 0.56 
Manipulated (n=20, p=0.01) 0.22 0.47 
Manipulated (n=30, p=0.05) 0.23 0.40 
Manipulated (n=30, p=0.01) 0.28 0.56 
Dependent Variable: Cost-Ineffective 
Manipulated (n=20, p=0.05)  0.33 0.85 
Manipulated (n=20, p=0.01) 0.54 1.39 
Manipulated (n=30, p=0.05) 0.30 0.83 
Manipulated (n=30, p=0.01) 0.43 1.18 
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Online Appendix: (Not for Publication) 
 
Table OA.1 
 
First-Stage Regressions 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Manipulated 
(n=20, 
p=0.05) 
Manipulated 
(n=20, 
p=0.01) 
Manipulated 
(n=30, 
p=0.05) 
Manipulated 
(n=30, 
p=0.01) 
GPA Covered -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
 (20.01)** (15.34)** (20.32)** (18.54)** 
Authority Type Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
 
 
Bunching Below Thresholds to Manipulate Public Procurement
  
Table OA.2 
Effect of Manipulation on Probability of Competitive Procedure (Open) 
 
 Logit  Logit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Manipulated  -0.49         
(n=20, p=0.05) (16.37)**         
Manipulated   -0.41        
(n=20, p=0.01)  (17.33)**        
Manipulated    -0.29       
(n=30, p=0.05)   (15.08)**       
Manipulated     -0.42      
(n=30, p=0.01)    (17.24)**      
Manipulated Interaction      -0.44    
(n=20, p=0.05)      (15.93)**    
Manipulated Interaction       -0.41   
(n=20, p=0.01)       (11.63)**   
Manipulated Interaction        -0.47  
(n=30, p=0.05)        (16.03)**  
Manipulated Interaction         -0.44 
(n=30, p=0.01)         (12.09)** 
Constant 16.45 17.50 18.03 18.01  17.46 17.49 17.97 18.01 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 258,943 258,943 218,334 218,334  258,943 258,943 218,334 218,334 
Authority Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. Robust z statistics in parentheses. 
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Table OA.3 
Effect of Manipulation on Probability of Competitive Procedure (Open) 
 
 IV GMM Linear Probability  IV GMM Linear Probability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Manipulated  -0.07         
(n=20, p=0.05) (2.55)*         
Manipulated   -0.10        
(n=20, p=0.01)  (2.50)*        
Manipulated    -0.16       
(n=30, p=0.05)   (7.02)**       
Manipulated     -0.22      
(n=30, p=0.01)    (5.95)**      
Manipulated Interaction      -0.07    
(n=20, p=0.05)      (2.51)*    
Manipulated Interaction       -0.11   
(n=20, p=0.01)       (2.49)*   
Manipulated Interaction        -0.18  
(n=30, p=0.05)        (6.02)**  
Manipulated Interaction         -0.23 
(n=30, p=0.01)         (6.03)** 
Below Threshold -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02  -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (7.60)** (8.34)** (11.52)** (10.29)**  (0.63) (1.56) (3.16)** (2.04)* 
Constant -0.06 -0.00 0.09 -0.04  -0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 
 (1.36) (2.75)** (3.56)** (4.89)**  (1.74) (0.80) (1.61) (4.66)** 
Observations 200,672 200,672 173,307 173,307  200,672 200,672 173,307 173,307 
Authority Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. Robust z statistics in parentheses.  
Bunching Below Thresholds to Manipulate Public Procurement
  
Table OA.4 
Robustness Analysis of Instrumental Variables in IV GMM Linear Probability Model 
Plausibly Exogenous Instrument 
 
Variable 95% Lower Bound 95% Upper Bound 
Manipulated (n=20, p=0.05) -0.12 -0.02 
Manipulated (n=20, p=0.01) -0.19 -0.02 
Manipulated (n=30, p=0.05) -0.19 -0.1 
Manipulated (n=30, p=0.01) -0.29 -0.15 
Manipulated Interaction (n=20, p=0.05) -0.13 -0.02 
Manipulated Interaction (n=20, p=0.01) -0.13 -0.02 
Manipulated Interaction (n=30, p=0.05) -0.23 -0.12 
Manipulated Interaction  (n=30, p=0.01) -0.31 -0.16 
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Table OA.5 
Effect of Manipulation on Procurement Cost-Effectiveness  
IV GMM with GPA-Covered as Instrumental Variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Manipulated 0.27         
(n=20, p=0.05) (4.98)**         
Manipulated  0.69        
(n=20, p=0.01)  (4.35)**        
Manipulated   0.16       
(n=30, p=0.05)   (4.02)**       
Manipulated     0.37      
(n=30, p=0.01)    (3.79)**      
Manipulated Interaction      0.19    
(n=20, p=0.05)      (4.91)**    
Manipulated Interaction       0.28   
(n=20, p=0.01)       (4.90)**   
Manipulated Interaction        0.15  
(n=30, p=0.05)        (4.31)**  
Manipulated Interaction         0.17 
(n=30, p=0.01)         (3.40)** 
Open Procedure -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04  -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 
 (32.38)** (15.03)** (28.48)** (17.60)**  (34.75)** (34.12)** (29.29)** (28.62)** 
Below Threshold 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00  -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 (4.98)** (3.19)** (1.86) (0.44)  (4.33)** (3.85)** (4.32)** (3.39)** 
Constant 0.90 0.91 0.05 -0.00  -0.18 0.06 0.97 -2.24 
 (28.96)** (29.16)** (30.85)** (0.07)  (18.61)** (60.66)** (22.42)** (19.12)** 
Observations 184,218 184,218 158,511 158,511  184,218 184,218 158,511 158,511 
Authority Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. Dependent variable is the ratio of procurement price and estimated cost. IV GMM estimation with GPA Covered IV 
variable.  Robust z statistics in parentheses. 
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Table OA.6 
Robustness Analysis of Instrumental Variables in IV GMM  
Plausibly Exogenous Instruments 
 
Variable 95% Lower Bound 95% Upper Bound 
Manipulated (n=20, p=0.05)  0.21 0.9 
Manipulated (n=20, p=0.01) 0.38 1.01 
Manipulated (n=30, p=0.05) 0.2 0.38 
Manipulated (n=30, p=0.01) 0.47 1.05 
Manipulated Interaction (n=20, p=0.05)  0.13 1 
Manipulated Interaction (n=20, p=0.01) 0.19 0.41 
Manipulated Interaction (n=30, p=0.05) 0.18 0.34 
Manipulated Interaction  (n=30, p=0.01) 0.25 0.46 
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Table OA.7 
 
First-Stage Regressions 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Manipulated 
(n=20, p=0.05) 
Manipulated 
(n=20, p=0.01) 
Manipulated 
(n=30, p=0.05) 
Manipulated 
(n=30, p=0.01) 
GPA Covered -0.013 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
 (22.22)** (19.63)** (26.31)** (21.46)** 
Authority Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
First-Stage Regressions 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Manipulated Interaction 
(n=20, p=0.05) 
Manipulated Interaction 
(n=20, p=0.01) 
Manipulated Interaction 
(n=30, p=0.05) 
Manipulated Interaction 
(n=30, p=0.01) 
GPA Covered -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
 (30.16)** (28.17)** (29.36)** (29.30)** 
Authority Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
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